The future of international political economy:Introduction to the 20th anniversary issue of RIPE by Johnson, Juliet et al.
The future of international political
economy: Introduction to the 20th
anniversary issue of RIPE
Juliet Johnson1, Daniel M€ugge2, Leonard
Seabrooke3, Cornelia Woll4, Ilene Grabel5
and Kevin P. Gallagher6
1Political Science, McGill University, Montreal, Canada; 2Political Science,
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands; 3Business and Politics,
Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark; 4CERI, Sciences Po
Paris, Paris, France; 5Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of
Denver, Denver, CO, USA; 6International Relations, Boston University,
Boston, MA, USA
An anniversary issue provides an inescapably inviting opportunity to
reflect on the past, evaluate the present, and contemplate the future.
Eschewing the self-congratulatory rhetoric of traditional anniversary cel-
ebrations, we have devoted this 20th anniversary issue of RIPE to contri-
butions that critically examine the academic discipline of international
political economy, focusing on our collective challenges and limitations
as much as on our achievements. As every author knows, it is the
thoughtful, constructive, and above all critical review that ultimately
pushes us to produce better scholarly work. The global financial crisis
mandates such a reassessment, as did the fall of communism that birthed
this journal.
John Hobson opens the anniversary issue with a two-part revisionist
historiography of our field. In Part One, he extends the transatlantic
‘British vs. American School’ debate sparked by Benjamin J. Cohen
(2007) to identify the Eurocentric metanarratives of classical and modern
political economy. In Part Two, Hobson deconstructs the Eurocentrism
of contemporary Open Economy Politics (OEP)1 and proposes an alterna-
tive research agenda for what he dubs an ‘inter-civilizational’ political
economy.
Review of International Political Economy, 2013
Vol. 20, No. 5, 1009–1023, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2013.835275
Catherine Weaver and Jason Sharman then take us on a quantitative
exploration of the transatlantic debate. Using survey data from the
Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) survey, they analyze
the evolution of IPE in international academic journals and curricula.
More specifically, they identify RIPE’s place within the discipline and the
extent to which RIPE has fulfilled its founders’ mandate to represent the
theoretical and methodological diversity of IPE scholarship.
Moving beyond the evolution of IPE, in this issue’s final research arti-
cle Stephen Nelson and Peter Katzenstein argue that the recent global
financial crisis demonstrates how fundamental uncertainty and financial
instability remain central to the dynamics of modern capitalism. The cri-
sis has posed a formidable challenge for students of IPE, which many
have met by reassessing the relevance of past scholarship to our under-
standing of the present (e.g. Cohen, 2007; Helleiner, 2011; Moschella,
2010; Mosley and Singer, 2009). To be sure, IPE as a field is ill-equipped
for prediction and does not consider this to be one of its main vocations
(Mosley and Singer, 2009: 420). But the re-discovery of uncertainty and
instability reminds us that scientific methods aspiring to transform true
uncertainty into calculable risk cannot but fail to foresee the future. An
excessive focus on time-invariant probabilities as the goal of IPE scholar-
ship is at odds with a need for sensitivity to the historical ruptures that
may creep up on us unnoticed if we take the highly contingent features
that define any era for granted until it is over.
The global financial crisis may in time spur deep intellectual shifts in
IPE scholarship, much as the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union promised to do two decades earlier. Those events
helped to convince a group of visionary scholars in the United Kingdom
to found a new journal, the Review of International Political Economy, dedi-
cated to challenging existing intellectual orthodoxies within IPE. When
RIPE published its first issue in 1994, the editorial board underlined the
profound impact that the fall of communism could and should have on
the social sciences:
We are only beginning to realize the extent to which the Cold War
intertwined with the orthodoxies. What we have witnessed in
recent years, and not just in Eastern Europe, has seriously shaken
the orthodoxies, thus providing a window of opportunity to bring
together analyses of former opposed positions (RIPE Editors 1994).
However, rather than enabling new dialogue between formerly
opposed traditions of thought, in practice the end of the Cold War
affected the broader field of political economy by, first, appearing to vin-
dicate liberal economic thought and, second, by making previously lively
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debates feel dated and of little use. Within IR, political economy was rele-
gated to the backseat. The events of 9/11, which gave a sense of urgency
and primacy to security studies, only reinforced this trend. Moreover, in
parts of IPE, notably in what Cohen has described as the ‘American
school’, scholars have sought to standardize inquiry in a positivist and
micro-analytical fashion. A review of the field in 2002 underlined
proudly that scholars have ‘approached consensus on theories, methods,
analytical frameworks, and important questions’ (Frieden and Martin,
2002: 118).
In this introduction to our 20th anniversary issue, we want to re-
emphasize and re-frame our founders’ insistence on questioning moves
towards orthodoxy, consensus, and closure, particularly in light of the
global financial crisis. Indeed, as the lively debate about differences
between American and British approaches to IPE demonstrated, it is
always wise to be wary of apparent consensus and intellectual monocul-
tures (Germain, 2009; Higgott andWatson, 2007; Keohane, 2009; Maliniak
and Tierney, 2009; McNamara, 2009). This debate brought to the fore age-
old cleavages in the study of social life: epistemological and methodolog-
ical questions, structure-agency debates, disagreements about the utility
of de-contextualized and ahistorical analysis, the merits and demerits of
parsimony, the desirability of a normative basis underlying IPE research,
and the importance of the practical ‘usefulness’ of research.
We continue to believe that these are core issues for scholars to con-
front directly. At the same time, as a focus of IPE scholarship, these
debates have at times turned academic in the negative sense of the word.
Any reasonably open-minded IPE scholar recognizes that there is no one
‘right’ way of doing IPE, if only because every way of generating knowl-
edge about the world we live in has severe limits. We argue below that
the global financial crisis has underscored the importance of embracing
what we call a ‘pragmatic IPE’, by which we mean an IPE that responds
to real-world developments and recognizes that complex examinations
of multi-faceted phenomena demand a commitment to methodological
pluralism and engagement across disciplines.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
FOR IPE RESEARCH
In the past 20 years RIPE has published insightful arguments on the fall
of communism and economies in transition, World Bank policy and
internal politics, the emergence of the World Trade Organization and the
new regionalism of trade and investment treaties, the international
monetary system and the International Monetary Fund, and far beyond,
without favouring any one voice, theoretical approach, or methodology.
RIPE articles have been written by political scientists, sociologists,
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geographers, and economists, and have featured research ranging from
realist analyses of monetary integration, to institutionalist assessments
of international financial institutions, to constructivist perspectives on
how powerful interest groups use certain ideas to reframe issues for
political gain.
That said, the crisis has laid bare some fundamental challenges for all
contemporary IPE scholarship. IPE researchers working in finance (par-
ticularly those influenced by Keynesian and post-Keynesian traditions in
economics) recognized the inherent vulnerabilities and power disparities
embedded in liberalized, internationally integrated, and opaque financial
markets (e.g., Helleiner, 2011; Blyth, 2002; Best, 2005; Cohen, 1998;
Kirshner, 2003, Abdelal, 2007). But the depth and virulence of the crisis
caught most scholars by surprise, notably if we consider research pub-
lished in the most highly ranked international relations journals. Indeed,
Manokha and Chalabi (2011) found that the majority of prominent inter-
national relations journals did not publish a single article on the financial
crisis in the years 2008–2011.
In particular, the challenges that the crisis presents to contemporary
quantitative IPE are greater than its practitioners concede (Leblang and
Pandya, 2009: 430-35; Mosley and Singer, 2009: 420–429; Lake, 2011: 45–
52). How can we reconcile the assumption that social reality is structured
by comprehensible mechanisms, presumed to produce patterns that
make them recognizable, with the existence of sudden ruptures such as
the crisis? The standard answer, compatible with much quantitative IPE
scholarship and the neoclassical economic models from which it takes
inspiration,2 is that exogenous shocks can disturb the mechanisms that
otherwise gravitate towards stability, be they social, political, or eco-
nomic. More sophisticated versions of this argument point to the existence
of multiple self-sustaining equilibria, shifts between which can be rapid.3
Yet whether or not such a view of IPE is plausible in general, it faces a
significant challenge if the shocks that it construes as exogenous are so
momentous that they significantly disrupt at least some of the patterns
that have hitherto characterized the global economy. Does what we
thought we had learned about the politics of diverse issues such as
domestic and international inequality, development, trade and invest-
ment patterns, aid politics, and democratic and autocratic politics in the
shadow of globalization still hold in a post-crisis world? Maybe yes,
maybe no. For us, answering that question is an empirical as much as a
theoretical challenge. But it is clear that much quantitative IPE scholar-
ship has seriously underestimated the historical contingency of the eco-
nomic and political realities that it analyzed.
Cohen (2009: 436–444) and others have claimed that this research has
necessarily missed the crisis because the tools it employs have systemati-
cally excluded events of the credit crisis-order from view. We have been
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witnessing one global crisis, not dozens of isolated national ones that
would readily lend themselves to large-n analysis (Oatley, 2011). Much
quantitative pre-crisis IPE scholarship had no crisis-expectation because
it takes ‘initial equilibrium [as a] starting point. [. . .] The underlying para-
digm of neoclassical economics emphasizes comparative statics rather
than dangerous dynamics’ (Cohen, 2009: 442). The method emphasizes
stability or incremental change because the patterns it seeks to uncover
are effectively a-historical. As Pevehouse and Brozek (2008: 465) have
argued:
The vast majority of statistical models that are published in political
science [..] posit a host of restrictions. Many of these assumed
restrictions, however, are untenable, such as assuming that all
explanatory variables are exogenous, lag structures are one period,
and coefficients are stable across the entire estimation sample.
The three problems Pevehouse and Brozek identify all apply to common
understandings of the crisis. Lag structures can vary enormously
(i.e., when do factors that contribute to the build-up of crisis actually
have an observable effect?). Coefficients may not only vary over time, but
they may also actually change sign – for instance, the accumulation of
public debt may promote or undermine economic growth. Factors that
contribute to financial stability at one point in time may erode it at
another. Advanced statistical techniques such as autoregressive inte-
grated moving average (ARIMA) or autoregressive conditionally hetero-
skedastic (ARCH) models may improve upon our ability to model these
diverse effects. But even these techniques are unable to capture the com-
plex dynamics of the crisis. As we have seen, the apparent relative stabil-
ity of the pre-crisis decades was unsustainable, and it also generated
conditions that enhanced the severity of the subsequent crisis by induc-
ing excessive confidence and optimism while simultaneously creating
intensely vulnerable financial superstructures (Akerlof and Shiller, 2010;
Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Minsky, 2008 [1986]; Rajan, 2011; Skidelsky, 2011).
Income and wealth inequality, wage compression, slow growth, global
and regional imbalances, and the power of the global financial commu-
nity during the ‘Great Moderation’ also contributed to the creation of the
‘light touch’ regulatory systems and fragile financial structures and
financing arrangements that culminated in the crisis (Baker, 2009; Crotty,
2009; MacEwan and Miller, 2011; Stiglitz, 2010; Tabb, 2012; Wade, 2008).
More broadly, the economics profession has also been affected by the
crisis. Not least, interest in the findings of behavioral economics is grow-
ing (e.g., Ariely, 2013; Kahneman, 2011), especially in regards to the
behavioural and neurobehavioural aspects of financial market actors
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(e.g., Coates, 2012), and there is new attention to the ways that the eco-
nomics profession itself may have contributed to the crisis (e.g., Colander
et al., 2009; DeMartino, 2010: ch. 10; Hodgson, 2009; Krugman, 2009;
Mirowski, 2010a, 2010b; Stiglitz, 2009).
The understanding of the crisis that thus emerges might be described
as contingent stability. Stable periods and phenomena are amenable to
quantitative treatment because they concern the systematic reproduction
of patterns over time. Contingencies, in contrast, are researchable
through qualitative methods at best because they are either incidental or
structural – and in any case come in such small numbers that statistical
treatment is not an option.4 Understanding history as alteration between
stability and change, with more or less abrupt ruptures, is fully compati-
ble with diverse yet historically sensitive landmark works in political
economy. While Charles Kindleberger’s The World in Depression spawned
the ‘hegemonic stability theory’ that so influenced international relations
as a field, it is Kindleberger’s Manias, Panics, and Crashes that represents
the historical cornerstone for understanding the political economy of
financial crises. Other work, such as Carr’s analysis of the 20 years’ crisis,
the oeuvre of Gramsci and Polanyi, and more recently Frieden’s Global
Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century (2006) should be
required reading for all IPE scholars before conducting applied research
on more recent events.
TOWARDS A ‘PRAGMATIC IPE’
Where do we go from here? Debates about research methods challenge
us to reflect on the inferential costs of any research strategy we choose –
something we too often ignore. But as our experiences with the crisis
demonstrate, they are no excuse for not taking the real-world problems
‘out there’ by the horns and using holistic and interdisciplinary perspec-
tives to tackle them. Seen from that angle, IPE research has matured in
recent years. In previous decades, scholars invested considerable energy
first to ‘prove’ that political economy mattered to international relations,
then that (historically grown) institutions mattered to IPE, and finally
that ideas mattered, too. Then leaving behind (for the most part) these
narrow debates, scholarship asked under which circumstances, in which
ways, and to what degree ideas or institutions mattered, and again
invested considerable effort in generating increasingly fine-grained
answers to these questions (e.g. Milner, Dobbin and Garrett, 2006). A key
lesson from this work is the importance of contingency: because no single
theoretical perspective offers exclusive purchase on reality, asking in
abstract terms which perspective is ‘right’ is not very enlightening. We
have learned (again) that what holds today may not hold tomorrow,
what holds in France may not hold in Finland, and what holds in finance
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may not hold in trade. Add a few more dimensions of complexity, and
modelling the real world in a way that still generates dependable pat-
terns and causal relations becomes a difficult, if not impossible job.
To our minds, these points argue in favour of a pragmatic IPE.
Pragmatic IPE accepts that scholars in the IPE community employ and
advance different kinds of methodological tools but also remembers that
these tools are just that – tools – and not ends in themselves. The ends are
contributions to debates about real-world problems that matter
(Keohane, 2009; Lake, 2010). One of the perennial attractions of IPE as an
inter-discipline is the irreverence with which its practitioners have
claimed exciting and relevant developments in global society as objects
of analysis. Money laundering, land-grabbing, water politics, and strug-
gles over access to life-saving medicines are fair game for IPE scholars
just as much as the twenty-first-century marriage of capitalism and state-
led development in China or the transformation of the global economy
through digital technology. If anything, the panoply of real-world topics
that IPE claims as its home turf is so broad that the greater challenge is to
identify those that may merit particular attention or for which IPE
approaches are particularly well placed to provide incisive analyses – a
point to which we return below.
If pragmatic IPE is marked by a focus on real-world problems rather
than on theory for its own sake, a rejection of any separation of politics
from ‘the economy’, an awareness that local and global developments
cannot be analyzed in isolation from one another and, in consequence, an
acknowledgement of the complexity of the world we study, we must
accept that there are limits to how watertight our analyses can ever be. In
the end, whatever its scientific aspirations, IPE remains an informed con-
versation by scholars who care and know about similar issues and take
both inspiration from and issue with each other’s readings of the world.
Such an approach suggests a middle road between what in earlier
debates has been stereotyped as British and American IPE. With Keohane
(2009), we cherish the normative aspirations of the former and the
eagerness to adjudicate between competing claims of the latter. An
empirical grounding remains essential to that mission and is the core to
works from scholars that Ravenhill (2009) characterized as the ‘missing
middle’ but which actually comprise much of the rank and file of IPE
scholarship in many parts of the world (see Sharman and Weaver, this
issue). Pragmatically, the question is not whether, for example, construc-
tivism or post-structuralism is ‘right’, but what insights each perspective
has to offer on specific issues in IPE that can withstand informed criti-
cism. That does not obviate the need for theory-focused discussions (e.g.
Bieler and Morton, 2008), but IPE should avoid getting stuck in methodo-
logical or epistemological navel-gazing while the world keeps on turning
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
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and offering up real problems and questions that demand our intellectual
attention (cf. Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009).
A SUBSTANTIVE IPE RESEARCH AGENDA
Espousing pragmatic IPE means being attentive to substantive problems
that influence debates at the intersection of politics and economics and
beyond national boundaries. This suggests that as a collective, IPE must
address both practices at the micro-level – regardless of whether they
concern, for example, gendered division of labour in average households
or patterned interactions among policy elites – and macro-level changes
such as structural transformations in trading patterns in the world econ-
omy. We should also be attentive both to long arcs of history and to the
short-term developments that actually animate the social, political and
economic actors we study. This is a tall order indeed.
Figure 1 provides illustrative examples of research topics plotted
according to their predominant time horizon and potential methods of
discovery (that is, a focus on micro-level dynamics or macro-level phe-
nomena or, more traditionally ‘agents’ and ‘structures’). Some of them
are well established in the IPE literature; others have hardly been
touched upon but are apt to provide important future challenges. Ever
since Susan Strange’s (1994) call for ‘catholic complexity rather than prot-
estant parsimony’ in response to the narrowing of the field that sparked
Figure 1: Illustrative IPE Topics by Time Horizon and Focus.
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the birth of the journal, methodological diversity has been praised in the
pages of Review of International Political Economy. Following this tradition
we suggest that different kinds of problems can be tackled by a range of
methods that themselves have a micro or macro focus. For example, we
suggest that many emerging issues of inquiry may be best addressed
with methods that have entered IPE scholarship more recently; for exam-
ple, network analysis (Henriksen, 2014; Young, 2013) or experimental
methods that target micro-level behaviour with macro-level consequen-
ces (Findley, Nelson, and Sharman 2013). We also acknowledge that theo-
ries and methods are not one and the same, but that tackling empirical
problems requires consideration and reflection on ontological, epistemo-
logical, theoretical, and methodological choices. Of course, these consid-
erations are interlinked and reflect different starting positions, training,
and skill sets. The key here is that reflections on how to address problems
that present different time horizons and questions of scale have long been
part of Review of International Political Economy and will continue to be so.
Starting from the top left and moving clockwise, we have identified
long-term topics such as geopolitics, transnational financial regulation,
currency competition, and resource struggles as often best suited to study
through micro-focused methods. Unraveling them is a micro-scale con-
cern inasmuch as it will be key to identify the often limited number of rel-
evant actors and understand their (perceived) interests. The time frames
in which the relevant politics unfold, as well as their implications, are
long rather than short-term. Similarly, tracing individual interests and
strategies in regards to sovereign wealth funds pose important questions
of how to theorize new practices and mechanisms of great power politics
(Blanchard, 2011). For such long-term topics, we envisage that conven-
tional methods such as process tracing will continue to be fruitful. Bring-
ing the political aspect of these IPE issues into the spotlight is
particularly important in order to broaden analysis beyond an OEP
framework.
In the top right quadrant we find long-term topics such as demo-
graphic shifts, climate change, and welfare state sustainability that can be
fruitfully addressed with macro-focused methods. Scholarship on wel-
fare state sustainability has included American work on retrenchment
and European and British research on discursive and institutional struc-
tures that permit enduring forms of neoliberalism (Schmidt and
Thatcher, 2013). Investigating long-term phenomena like climate change
and demographic change naturally require large datasets. These topics
can also be studied through a combination of macro- and micro-focused
approaches, such as tracing the cultural and political forces that place the
car at the centre of modern capitalism and how it is embedded in every-
day life (Paterson, 2007), or following macro trends on demographic
change and professional activity in order to combat its perceived
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
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problems (Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2013). The reality of systemic instabil-
ity prompted by factors as diverse as the rise of China and economic
innovation (both in terms of technologies and processes) should keep us
on our toes as well.
In the bottom right corner we situate short-term topics that can be
addressed with more macro-focused approaches. We have named con-
servation, trafficking, and shadow finance as examples. Recent work on
conservation has identified harm through tourism and located it
within broader logics of neoliberalism (Duffy, 2013). On human traffick-
ing, new research has used panel data to provide a quantitative assess-
ment of the differential impact of social and economic globalization on
women’s rights during the past two decades, highlighting how economic
globalization, by itself, does little for rights for trafficked women, and
that improved conditions require longer-term changes in social attitudes
and perceptions (Cho, 2013). Early studies of shadow finance markets
involving phenomena such as remittances, non-state currencies, and
‘offshore’ banking have identified how to locate these activities
within more conventional structures of financial capitalism (Palan and
Nesvetailova, 2013).
Finally, the bottom left corner is occupied by short-term topics that can
fruitfully be studied with micro-focused approaches. In this quadrant we
stress the importance of examining policy networks, lobbying, and the
creation of deliberative forums, as depicted for example in the Experi-
mentalist Governance literature (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2010). To map links
between actors, social network analysis is an important tool to deploy
(van Apeldoorn and de Graaf, 2012). Elite interviewing is vital to under-
standing how those involved in policy networks and lobbying view their
interests, mandates, and themselves, such as belonging to a profession,
institution, or network. One exemplary methodological innovation is to
trace policy in international organizations to team composition, linking
the micro phenomenon – the team working on a particular issue – to
broader policy implications (Chwieroth, 2012).
THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS
We neither can nor would want to predict all areas of inquiry that will
come to the attention of IPE practitioners and scholars in the years to
come. That said, the rise of emerging economies will inevitably shape
future IPE inquiry, as will concerns surrounding sovereign debt and
global imbalances, the social and environmental impact of international
economic activities, the rise and governance of technologies such as the
Internet or biofuels, and ever-evolving class, gender, and ethnic interac-
tions and inequalities. Many other issues could be added to this list, and
many in fact engage both short and long-term phenomena at multiple
JOHNSON ET AL.: INTRODUCTION
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levels of analysis. Our micro/macro and long/short plotting exercise is
not intended to put real-world problems in neat boxes once again.
Instead, it illustrates how moving beyond agency-structure debates can
give us a clearer sense of the empirical consequences of the problems on
which we focus our research. Resolving theoretical debates whose contri-
butions remain entirely abstract will do little to illuminate pressing issues
for people affected by the international political economy in their every-
day lives.
As reflected in our plea for a ‘pragmatic IPE’, RIPE champions scholar-
ship in which concrete, relevant research questions drive methodological
choice and theoretical approaches. Different research questions demand
different methods and interpretations. For example, a question such as
‘Does the IMF still mandate conditionality programmes?’ could compre-
hensively be answered in a large-n statistical analysis of countries with
and without IMF country programmes combined with parallel case study
analysis for verification. On the other hand, a question such as ‘Do new
economic theories about financial stability drive decisions in the IMF?’
can only be answered through systematic interviews with IMF decision-
makers. RIPE has always welcomed diverse analyses, as long as the
research questions are sharp and they are answered with the appropriate
methodological tools. On this 20th anniversary of RIPE, we eagerly look
forward to extending the reach of pragmatic IPE, to preserving the jour-
nal’s role as a forum for open-minded and lively scholarly debate, and to
uphold its proud Hirschmanian tendencies to trespass across disciplin-
ary boundaries in ways that illuminate dynamic, complex, and ever-
changing social phenomena.
NOTES
1 Lake (2009, 225) summarizes OEP as follows: ‘OEP begins with individuals,
sectors, or factors of production as the units of analysis and derives their inter-
ests over economic policy from each unit’s position within the international
economy. . . Analysis within OEP proceeds from the most micro- to the most
macro-level in a linear and orderly fashion, reflecting an implicit uni-
directional conception of politics as flowing up from individuals to interstate
bargaining.’
2 This scholarship often has an underlying assumption that social processes tend
towards order in some form and hence stability, meaning that the reproduction
of the status quo is more likely than is significant change. This concerns rela-
tive stability in prices, political systems, economic organization, social mores,
etc. Turmoil is the exception, not the rule.
3 For example, both liberal democracy and clientelistic authoritarian regimes
might be self-reproducing. Of course, recent events in the Maghreb have
dented this view in the same way the implosion of the USSR dented interna-
tional relations orthodoxy two decades ago. We tend to stick with observable
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trends, however, and political stability is visible while it lasts, whereas the rot
of a political order from within may not be.
4 Eichengreen seconds this dichotomy when he writes that ‘the alternative to
theory is history’ (Eichengreen, 2009: 58). But history is not without its own
dangers. It is a biased guide to the future, providing a very selective reading of
the present. For example, as head of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke seems
to have relied heavily on his own interpretation of the Great Depression when
formulating his policy response to the credit crisis. The jury is still out on both
whether this medicine has cured the patient and whether the two episodes
were really comparable in the ways he presumed.
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